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Compensation for Damage to Property
Caused by Low-Flying Aircraft
Recent developments in the lmv of compensation for prop-
erty under the fifth amendment and similar state con-
stitutional provisions have left unclear the requisites for
recovery by a private party for damage caused by low-
flying aircraft. The author of this Note examines the ap-
plication of trespass and nuisance concepts in aircraft
cases and concludes that use of these tort concepts as ulti-
mate constitutional requirements leads to arbitrariness and
confusion. He therefore proposes the abandonment of
trespass and nuisance as ultimate requirements for com-
pensation in favor of a test that examines all factors rele-
vant to balancing the public interest in the complained-of
activity against the public interest in preserving the sanc-
tity of private property.
INTRODUCTION
The recent expansion in air traffic has produced a concomi-
tant increase in the number of claims for injuries to private prop-
erty caused by low overflights. The major portion of this expan-
sion emanates from military installations and municipally-owned
civil terminals constructed with the aid of federal subsidies.' The
landowners injured by these overflights have had to rely largely
upon constitutional theories providing compensation under the
power of eminent domain to remedy this taking of private prop-
erty.2 Tort actions for trespass or nuisance, the traditional grounds
for recovery from private defendants, ' are often unavailable
against any governmental body. The doctrine of sovereign im-
munity and the Tucker Act' generally bar such tort claims, while
1. See Federal Aid for Public Development Act, 60 Stat. 170 (1946), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1101-19 (Supp. 1962).
2. See Note, 24 U. PIT. L. REV. 603, 606 (1963); 63 COLUmi. L. REv.
755, 756 (1963).
3. See 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 1-10 (1953);
PROSSER, TORTS §§ 13-15, 70-74 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§§ 159, 194 (1934). See also UNFORM AERONAUTICS ACT (1923). Although
the Uniform Aeronautics Act has been withdrawn by the Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws, it has been enacted at various times by 23 states.
See Anderson, Some Aspects of Airspace Trespass, 27 J. AIR L. & CoaM.
341 (1960), for a summary of tort remedies for trespass and nuisance. See
also Note, 24 U. Prrr. L. REV. 603, 606-08 (1963).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1958). This act, which grants jurisdiction
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the Federal Tort Claims Act5 provides no remedy for non-negli-
gent or discretionary acts of federal employees. The purpose of
this Note is to examine the requirements necessary to establish a
constitutional taking of property by low-flying airplanes, to evalu-
ate the effect of these requirements on the rights of landowners,
and to suggest ways to eliminate some of the inequities in the
present application of eminent domain to airspace.
I.
Under present constitutional provisions, a landowner must es-
tablish that there has been a taking before he can recover for an
interference with the use of his land. The fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that private property shall
not "be taken for public use, without just compensation." The
fourteenth amendment extends this protection to the taking of
property by the states.' In addition, all state constitutions7 but
two" explicitly require compensation for property appropriated
to public use. Moreover, some states have gone further by adding
constitutional provisions that allow compensation for an inter-
ference with the use of, or an injury to, property. 9
Under all of these provisions, courts traditionally have required
an actual physical invasion of private property-a trespass-be-
fore finding a constitutional taking. 0 Strict adherence to this
trespass requirement in highway condemnations has often led to
arbitrary and consequently inequitable distinctions even in
those jurisdictions having constitutional "injury" provisions. For
example, if a highway is relocated and made into a limited ac-
cess highway, the landowners who have property adjoining the old
over suits brought against the United States to the federal district courts,
specifically excludes tort actions.
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680(a) (1958); see Dalelite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15 (1953).
6. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
7. See 1 ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1.
8. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XII; N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 17. Both these
states, however, have judicially extended protection against uncompensat-
ed taking. Petition of Mount Washington Rd. Co., 35 N.H. 134 (1856);
Staton v. Norfolk & C.R.R., 111 N.C. 278, 16 S.E. 181 (1892); see Note,
1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 210, 236-37.
9. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 13, which provides: "Private property
shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just
compensation therefor, first paid or secured." Nichols lists 25 states with
essentially the same provisions. E.g., CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 14; ILL.
CONST. art. II, § 13; see 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.1[3] n.23
(3d ed. 1950).
10. See, e.g., City of Crookston v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 321, 69 N.W.
2d 909 (1955); In re Hull, 163 Minn. 439, 204 N.W. 534 (1925); 2
NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 6.1, .2, .38.
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highway will suffer a great loss of business. Under present law,
if the new highway takes any portion of a landowner's property,
he will recover for the land taken and for the resulting loss of
business. If the highway does not take any part of his property,
however, the landowner will receive no compensation even though
he may lose more business than one whose land is physically
taken.11
Surely a person should be awarded compensation for land phy-
sically appropriated. But to the extent that the courts choose to
compensate further for any injury to business or residence caused
by a taking, they should not preclude recovery merely because
no property has been appropriated. Yet, strict adherence to tres-
pass doctrines has led the courts to just this anomaly.' The
anomaly is heightened by holding that once a partial taking is
established, injuries such as the loss of the flow of traffic, which
would seem to be separate elements of recovery, are considered
factors in measuring market value of the property to determine
compensation for the partial taking.1 3 These injuries are usually
deemed consequential and thus unavailable to one whose land is
not physically taken.14
While the trespass requirement is still rigidly enforced in high-
way cases,'" an inspection of cases involving the taking of air
easements reveals somewhat more flexible standards being used to
determine compensability.'6 The opinions in these cases reflect
the fact that courts have imported elements of tort recovery in
nuisance cases-excessive noise and dangerously low overflights-
into the determination of whether an interference with the use of
land by low-flying aircraft amounts to the taking of an air ease-
ment.' Indeed, some opinions have suggested bypassing the
11. See Pike County v. Whittington, 263 Ala. 47, 51, 81 So. 2d 288,
292 (1955) (dissent); Jehoda v. State Rd. Dept., 106 So. 2d 870 (Fla.
1958); Riddle v. State Highway Comm'n, 184 Kan. 603, 623, 339 P.2d
301, 317 (1959) (dissenting in part). But cf. Hendrickson v. State, 31 U.S.L.
WEEK 2559 (Minn. May 3, 1963).
12. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Slaughter, 49 N.M. 141, 158 P.2d
859 (1945); Nelson v. State Highway Bd., 110 Vt. 44, 1 A.2d 689 (1938).
13. See Riddle v. State Highway Comm'n, 184 Kan. 603, 339 P.2d 301
(1959); Comment, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 202 (1959).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499
(1945); Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1879); Harris v. United
States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953); JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN § 51 (1953).
See generally Note, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 313.
15. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
16. See Note, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1581, 1582-85 (1961).
17. Many of these cases stress the noise and fear caused by low-flying
aircraft. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d
580, 585-87 (10th Cir. 1962) (dissent); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55
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trespass requirement altogether in this area and looking directly
to the nature of the injuries to determine if there has been a tak-
ing.iS
The Supreme Court in United States v. Causby9 provided the
modem basis for the law of eminent domain in airspace when it
rejected the common-law ad coelum doctrine that ownership of
land extended upwards to infinity.20 It thus supported the thesis
of the Air Commerce Act21 that airspace above the minimum al-
Wash. 2d 400, 401, 348 P.2d 664, 665 (1958); Anderson, supra note 3, at
350-55; Harvey, Landowners Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma,
56 MICH. L. REV. 1313, 1315-16 (1958); Note, Airplane Noise: Problem
in Tort Law and Federalism, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1581, 1583-85 (1961); cf.
Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201, 203 (6th Cir. 1962); At-
kinson v. Bernard, Inc., 223 Ore. 624, 631-34, 355 P.2d 229, 232-33
(1960); RHYNE, AIRPORTS AND THE COURTS 133 (1944). But see Batten v.
United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
955 (1963), criticized in 63 COLUM. L. REV. 755, 761-62 (1963), 111 U.
PA. L. REV. 837, 839 (1963).
18. "It is my thesis that a constitutional taking does not necessarily de-
pend on whether the Government physically invaded the property dam-
aged." Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 586 (10th Cir. 1962) (dis-
senting opinion), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963). Cf. Atkinson v. Ber-
nard, Inc., 223 Ore. 624, 631-32, 355 P.2d 229, 232 (1960):
Whether Oregon courts should meet the airport problem with the an-
cient and formal doctrine of trespass . . . is still an open question.
B . .[V]e are impressed with the logic of those cases which have
met the problem frankly as a matter for the application of the law
of nuisance.
Although the Atkinsan case involved a private airport and thus does not
deal with a taking, its reasoning is equally applicable to eases that allege
nuisance injuries as a taking. See Jacobs v. City of Seattle, 93 Wash.
171, 178, 160 Pac. 299, 302 (1916); cf. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny
County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation
Law, 1962 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 63, 89.
19. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). Respondents purchased a 2.8 acre chicken
farm outside of Greensboro, North Carolina, in 1934 near an airport that
had been in existence since 1928. Beginning in 1942, the United States by
contract with the airport authority flew military planes to and from the air-
port. These flights passed over respondents' property at a height of 83 feet,
disturbing respondents and frightening their chickens to such an extent
that many were killed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of
Claims that an easement was taken, but remanded to the Court of Claims
to make findings of fact as to whether the easement was permanent or
temporary.
20. Cuius est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, or "he who owns the
soil owns everything above." 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *18. The ad
coelum interest was protected at common law by the writ of trespass quare
clausum fregit. See Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922); Pickering v. Rudd, 4 Camp. 219, 171 Eng.
Rep. 70 (1815); Penruddock's Case, 5 Coke 100, 77 Eng. Rep. 210 (1597).
The development of the ad coelum doctrine is well summarized in Anderson,
supra note 3, at 341-43. See also Klein. Cuiuv Est Solum Elus Est . . .
Quousque Tandem?, 26 J. AIR L. & COM. 237 (1959).
21. 52 Stat. 973 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1958).
titudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Board2 con-
stitutes navigable airspace in which there exists "a public right of
freedom of transit." 3 The Court declared airspace, "apart from
the immediate reaches above the land," to be in the public
domain;2 thus, overflights are not a taking of private property
unless they are a "direct and immediate interference with the en-
joyment and use of the land. ' ' 5 Applying this test, the Court
found that the overflights in Causby constituted the taking of an
easement because they affected the nerves of the landowners and
destroyed their business.26
Although the Court did not find it necessary to define what
are the "immediate reaches above the land" or to specify how low
and frequent flights must be to constitute a taking, it did find
that "navigable air space" did not include glide paths.' Con-
gress responded to this decision by amending the Air Commerce
Act to make navigable airspace "include airspace needed to in-
sure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft. ' The effect of
this amendment was considered by the Supreme Court in the re-
cent case of Griggs v. Allegheny County.0 While the Court rec-
ognized that Congress acted in response to Causby, it neverthe-
less reiterated what it said in that case: "The use of land presup-
poses the use of some of the airspace above it. . . . An invasion
of the 'super-adjacent airspace' will often 'affect the use of the sur-
face of the land itself.' ""' The Court then held that because the
approachway to the airport caused flights to pass as low as 30
feet over the appellant's property, it constituted a taking of an air
easement for which the county, as owner of the airport, must com-
pensate the appellant.32
22. These minimum altitudes are now established by the administrator
of the "Federal Aviation Agency. 52 Stat. 980 (1938), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 1301 (1958). The minimum altitude for congested areas is 1000
feet, for noncongested areas is 500 feet. 14 C.F.R. § 60.17 (1962).
23. 52 Stat. 979 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1958).
24. 328 U.S. at 266.
25. Ibid.
26. Id. at 259, 263.
27. This was unnecessary because the findings of the Court of Claims had
clearly established a causal connection between the flights and the decrease
in the value of respondents' property. See 328 U.S. at 266-67.
28. Id. at 263-64. See Harvey, supra note 17, at 1314 for a definition of
glide paths.
29. 72 Stat. 739 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1958).
30. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
31. 369 U.S. at 89. Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400,
348 P.2d 664 (1960), also declared approachways not to be within navi-
gable airspace. The court in that case seemed to imply that such congres-
sional appropriation of airspace would be unconstitutional. Id. at 411-12,
348 P.2d at 670.
32. The county was held liable on the theory that since it designed and
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Causby has been interpreted to require proof of actual damage
before recovery will be allowed for a taking. For example, flights
over property by propellor-driven planes were not a taking be-
cause they did not interfere with the use and enjoyment of prop-
erty, but a subsequent conversion to jet flights at the same al-
titude, since it created greater noise and vibration, was a taking.33
Thus, a landowner who succeeded in establishing the requisite
trespass would still have to prove enough overflights of a deleteri-
ous nature to establish the actual damage necessary to constitute
a taking under the fifth amendment. Once a physical trespass is
established and the landowner proves sufficient damage to consti-
tute a taking, however, the measure of damages is not limited to
the value of the easement taken, but includes damage to the re-
mainder of the property.34 The measure of damages thus in-
cludes any depreciation in the fair market value of the property
that is attributable to the taking of the easement. 35
II.
While the Court in both Causby36 and Griggs"7 emphasized the
nuisance concepts of noise and danger as the primary interfer-
ence with the use of the property, it premised recovery on the con-
tinuing trespass by the approachway on the property. 3 This fact
constructed the airport, it was bound to condemn enough property to pro-
vide the necessary approachways. 369 U.S. at 89-90; accord, Ackerman
v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 413, 348 P.2d 664, 671 (1960); cf.
Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934). Mr. Jus-
tice Black, in dissent, argued that the federal government should be li-
able for the taking because the airport expansion was undertaken pursuant
to a federal program and financed largely with federal funds. 369 U.S. at
90-94.
33. Highland Park, Inc. v. United States, 142 Ct. Cl. 269, 161 F. Supp.
597 (1958); cf. Matson v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 225, 171 F. Supp.
283 (1958); Anderson, supra note 3, at 351-52.
34. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Koff, 341 Ill. 520, 173 N.E. 666
(1930); Riddle v. State Highway Comm'n, 184 Kan. 603, 339 P.2d 301
(1959); 1 ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 3, § 52; Note, 72 YALE L.J. 392, 395
(1963).
35. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943). The fair market value
test assumes a natural bargaining situation with a voluntary buyer and
seller. Roberts v. New York, 295 U.S. 264 (1935). See 1 BONBRIGHT, VALU-
ATION OF PROPERTY 66-97 (1937); 4 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 9, § 12.2
[1]; 1 ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 22-23. In a partial taking situa-
tion where the severed part does not have a value equal to its propor-
tionate share of the value of the unsevered whole, the owner is com-
pensated for the entire value he has lost. This is computed either by adding
the damage to the value of the remainder to the actual value of the prop-
erty taken, or by subtracting the value of the remainder from the total
value before the taking. Note, 72 YALE L.J. 392, 395 (1963).
36. 369 U.S. at 86-87.
37. 328 U.S. at 258-59.
38. 369 U.S. at 88-89; 328 U.S. at 264-65; see Batten v. United States,
could indicate that the physical trespass requirement will be read
into the federal constitution, making the determination of a taking
a mere question of wing span. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit, in Bat-
ten v. United States,39 interpreted Causby and Griggs to re-
quire direct overflights before there could be a taking of an air
easement. The court denied recovery to landowners who had
established interference with the use of their property. The noise
and danger from the overflights were of apparently greater magni-
tude than that found in either Griggs or Causby,40 but the land-
owners were not able to prove that the flights passed directly over
their property.
The court in Batten indicated, however, that if the operations
had forced the landowners to vacate their homes there might have
been a compensable taking:.1 This restriction that a taking with-
out a trespass must amount to an ouster of possession is contrary
to the recognition in Causby42 and Griggs43 of property rights
in the use and enjoyment of land.4 Moreover, it presents the
landowner with a three-pronged dilemma. If he remains on the
property, he will be precluded from recovery under Batten; if he
sells the property at a depreciated price, he loses his standing to
claim full compensation; if he abandons the property at a com-
plete loss, he will incur the expense of substitute housing while
awaiting a determination of whether he was forced to leave or
chose to do so because of mere inconvenience.
Landowners who suffer injury from low-flying airplanes but
cannot establish an actual trespass may be denied recovery in
the federal courts unless the courts follow the dissenting opinion
of Chief Judge Murrah in Batten and regard the presence or ab-
sence of nuisance injuries as determinative of a taking. Judge
Murrah considered the takings in Causby and Griggs to be based
upon nuisance-type injuries; a physical trespass is merely a coin-
cidental factor common, but not essential to, a majority of deci-
sions finding constitutional takings.45 He therefore found no com-
306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963), 63
COLUM. L. REV. 755,761 (1963).
39. 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
40. Id. at 581-83.
41. Id. at 585.
42. 328 U.S. at 266.
43. 369 U.S. at 89.
44. See Dunham, supra note 18, at 87, who states that "there is no jus-
tification in the precedents for a requirement that the condemnor actually
go upon or over or under the objector's surface land." He would call the
"right to interfere with enjoyment of the claimant's property . . . an ease-
ment . . . ."Ibid.
45. Id. at 586.
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pelling reason to adhere to a strict trespass requirement, but pre-
scribed a test that would award compensation if an interference
with the use and enjoyment of property was of sufficient direct-
ness, peculiarity, and magnitude "that fairness and justice
• . . requires the burden imposed to be borne by the public
and not by the individual alone."46
Even if the federal courts follow the Batten decision and im-
pose a strict trespass requirement, the landowners who will be pre-
cluded from recovery in the federal courts may be able to recover
in a state court, especially if the state constitution permits recovery
for injury to property in the absence of a taking." In Acker-
man v. Port of Seattle,48 61 property owners sought compensa-
tion for the encroachment of an airport approachway. Although
the Washington Supreme Court found the frequent low flights to
be a taking, it recognized that this finding was not essential to
recovery.49 If the landowners could establish that the noise and
fear caused by the flights was substantial and unreasonable, they
could recover under the Washington constitutional provision that
requires compensation for damage to private property. 50
These state constitutional provisions may provide a broader ba-
sis for recovery than the fifth amendment. State courts need not
be bound by the implication that Batten drew from Griggs and
Causby that a taking requires an actual physical invasion. State
constitutional provisions requiring compensation for the taking of
property need not be limited to an actual trespass; courts interpret-
ing these provisions can openly reject trespass and adopt the bal-
ancing of interests method utilized in the nuisance approach. 1
Moreover, the purpose of provisions in certain state constitutions
that allow compensation for injury to property was to expand the
limits of compensability beyond a physical trespass.52
III.
The availability of a broader remedy in state courts should not
minimize the significance of the trespass requirement. Both the
state and federal courts should abandon the requirement of an
46. Id. at 587; 63 COLUM. L. REV. 755, 761-62 (1963).
47. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
48. 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
49. Id. at 404, 406, 348 P.2d at 666, 667.
50. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 16; see note 9 supra and accompanying text.
Recovery under this provision was not allowed, however, because the three
year statute of limitations had expired. Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55
Wash. 2d at 406, 348 P.2d at 667.
51. See note 18 supra.
52. See Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161, 168 (1888); Brown v. City of
Seattle, 5 Wash. 35, 39, 31 Pac., 313, 314 (1892).
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actual trespass to establish the taking of an air easement because
the imposition of that requirement will lead to injustice in many
cases. A nuisance test will usually be more equitable. For exam-
ple, if airplanes continually pass within 50 feet of both A's and
B's houses, the noise and fear should be the same for both even
though no airplane flies directly over any of B's property. Yet
if the trespass requirement is imposed, A will be able to recover
the value of the easement taken as well as for any resulting de-
preciation in the market value of his property,'m while B will re-
cover nothing.1 If, instead of trespass, nuisance is the test, both
A and B would be entitled to compensation.'m The injuries suf-
fered by A and B are identical, and the public interest in main-
taining these flights is the same; absent trespass, there is no basis
for distinguishing between them.
Closer analysis of this problem, however, reveals that this ref-
erence to nuisance is superfluous. Nuisance has been character-
ized as being a traditionally vague remedy that "has meant all
things to all men," and serves as an "excellent . . . illustration
of the familiar tendency of the courts to seize upon a catchword
as a substitute for any analysis of a problem."' 6 Insofar as courts
utilize nuisance concepts, they are in fact determining the rea-
sonableness of the interference by weighing the public utility
against the private harm.5" All these relevant interests could be
balanced, and the presence or absence of a taking thereby deter-
mined, through direct reference to the constitutional provisions
that require compensation for a taking.
Once a balancing test is adopted, whether openly or under the
guise of nuisance, a delineation of those factors that should be
balanced is important. The basic interests involved are the pub-
lic interest in air travel and the public interest in maintaining
the sanctity of private property. In a specific case, the effect that
the noise, glare and fear of crash from the low-flying air-
53. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
54. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
55. Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc., 223 Ore. 624, 355 P.2d 229 (1960); see
Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir. 1962) (dissent).
56. PROSSER, TORTS § 70, at 389 (2d ed. 1955).
57.
Reasonableness is so inherent in the judicial balancing of interests in
the airport cases that most of the decisions . . . simply proceed to
investigate the facts and then grant or deny relief upon the basis of
the reasonableness of one interest yielding to another in a given case.
* . . In following such a balancing of interests as a means of reaching
a decision, the courts employ nuisance concepts with only a passing
gesture in the direction of the law of trespass.
Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc., 223 Ore. 624, 632, 355 P.2d 229, 232 (1960).
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planes has upon the owner's enjoyment of his property for resi-
dential or business purposes should be balanced against the public
interest in maintaining these flights. The latter interest may de-
pend upon the need for an airport to promote civic growth,5"
military and defense needs,5 9 or the national interest in com-
mercial air terminals."0
One factor that should be considered in the balancing test is
the notice of any planned expansion of the airport's facilities the
property owners had at the time they purchased land adjacent to
the airport.61 If the landowners did have notice, arguably they
should not be compensated for the damage to the use of the land
because they assumed the risk of the expansion.6" The price that
such landowners paid for their property would presumably reflect
the risk of damage from future expansion of the airport; to allow
compensation in such a case would give the purchaser a wind-
fall. For example, a speculator could purchase vacant property ad-
jacent to an airport at a price reflecting the possibility that air-
port expansion might destroy the value of the property for com-
mercial use. If the expansion is not made, he will have bought
the property at a depreciated value; if the expansion is made and
the speculator is compensated for the full market value of the prop-
erty, he will also enjoy a profit. Yet, if the airport only pays him
the amount he paid for the property, the airport will enjoy a wind-
fall because it did not compensate prior owners for the deprecia-
tion they suffered from the airport's publicizing the possibility of
expansion.
A possible solution to this windfall to the airport would be to
allow the owner of property threatened by possible encroachment
of an expanding airport to demand immediate appraisal of his
land. The appraised value could then be filed and would serve to
preserve his right to compensation for the deficiency between this
value and the price received in any subsequent good faith sale.
The subsequent purchaser could then only receive compensation
for any depreciation incurred subsequent to his purchase of the
property. Preserving the rights of prior owners in this way would
58. See Brooks v. Patterson, 159 Fla. 263, 31 So. 2d 472 (1947).
59. See Stengel v. Crandon, 156 Fla. 592, 23 So. 2d 835 (1945).
60. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 90 (1962) (dissenting
opinion); Comment, Air Law-The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 57 Micui.
L. REV. 1214 (1959).
61. See Brooks v. Patterson, 159 Fla. 263, 266, 31 So. 2d 472, 473
(1947).
62. But cf. Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc., 223 Ore. 624, 355 P.2d 229
(1960), where the court granted an injunction against certain overflights.
The court passed over the fact that the airport was built in 1918, while the




prevent a windfall to both the speculator and the airport. In ad-
dition, this method would allow the owner of property threatened
by such expansion to escape the dilemma of maintaining property
of no value to himself for fear of losing full compensation.'
Thus, the threatened property could be sold and put to a valuable
use by the purchaser without the seller losing money as a result
of the possibility of airport expansion.
CONCLUSION
The law of eminent domain in airspace has generally followed
the law of eminent domain in highway condemnations-the land-
owner must establish a trespass before he can recover for the in-
terference with the use of his land. Yet, even under this trespass
requirement, most courts have imported nuisance concepts into
the determination of a taking. In deciding whether a landowner
has a right to compensation, they balance the public interest in
the use and enjoyment of property against the public interest in
promoting air travel. The equitable results that may be obtained
under this balancing test alone justify abolition of the trespass re-
quirement. Moreover, the reference to nuisance that courts make
in applying this balancing test is confusing and superfluous and,
therefore, it should also be abandoned.
Perhaps even this balancing test is not the ultimate equitable
solution to the problem of adjusting landowners' rights to the
taking of air easements. Even if the public interest in a particu-
lar flight outweighs the interest of a particular landowner, or if
the public interest in freedom of air travel outweighs the public
interest in protecting the use of private property, the conclusion
that the landowner should not be compensated for the damage
from low overflights is not necessarily justifiable. The public
interest in promoting air travel should certainly not be used to shift
the cost of developing this interest from the public to the injured
landowners by denying them compensation for their injuries.4
63. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
64. "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to im-
prove the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
Cf. Harvey, supra note 17, at 1332, who suggests that the solution to the
airport problem lies in legislative action.
Increasingly we, must turn to preventive techniques which forestall
the development of sharp conflicts of legitimate interests by wise plan-
ning of much broader areas than are conventionally considered in zon-
ing regulations. . . . Neither the welfare of aviation nor our tradi-
tional respect for the owner's rights in his land can be summarily sacri-
ficed.
Ibid.
1963]
